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The Money Makers 
Peter Hollitscher 
After extended discussion—and heated controversy— 
the Accounting Principles Board of the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants adopted in July new 
rules on accounting for corporate mergers. Designed to 
reduce the reporting options open to merging compa-
nies, the rules will have a definite effect on new business 
combinations—probably leading executives to seek 
even more guidance in these delicate dealings. 
At Touche Ross the man they will continue to turn to 
is our Director of Client Mergers and Acquisitions, Her-
bert Weiner, a partner with extensive experience with 
the intricacies of combining businesses. 
Here Mr. Weiner talks with two new associates, Peter 
Hollitscher and Norman Schuster, about the ingredients 
that bring two companies together in a successful union. 
Because many discussions of mergers and acquisi-
tions are concerned with specific techniques and me-
chanics, Mr. Weiner has chosen to stress the general 
characteristics of a successful deal—and how APB 
Opinions 16 and 17 will affect them. 
For your convenience, we have included at the end a 
summary of the opinions prepared by the AICPA. 
The ingredients for closing 
We find it difficult to tell in advance if a deal—and here 
we mean any kind of transaction—is going to close. 
We've seen some that looked certain to fall apart. Why 
did this happen? 
You can tell if a deal has the ingredients for closing, 
but they have to be mixed correctly before a deal can 
occur. Obviously, everyone would like to prevent a long 
and costly pre-closing experience that ends in frustra-
tion. 
The ingredients are a satisfactory "chemistry" be-
tween the parties and an apparent sound economic 
benefit for each party. For the right chemistry you need 
mutual respect and the ability to work out problems to-
gether. Before every transaction closes problems that 
were not originally contemplated will be uncovered. If 
the people involved can't talk the problems out to a rea-
sonable solution, the deal will fall apart. 
So "chemistry" is the ability to communicate? 
Not entirely. To me it is more than that—it is the ability 
to create collectively. 
What about the economics? 
Economic benefit is the essential motivation for the 
closing, and price is the key factor in the economic pic-
ture. Remember that price includes not only the cash, 
notes and securities, but also compensation contracts, 
representations and warranties, and elements of control. 
If I had to select the one key factor that would culminate 
a deal—would change the status quo—I would select 
price. With an attractive price a buyer or seller will often 
close the transaction in spite of poor chemistry. 
The function of a catalyst 
There has to be something else—a catalyst or maybe 
a go-between to prevent outside elements from interfer-
ing and to help the chemistry and economics to work? 
Right. It is quite possible for the parties to work out a 
deal by themselves—even with great chemistry and 
economics—and still have it fail. Today, some expertise 
is often needed to shape or mold the proposed deal. For 
example, the attitude of an outside party, such as the 
government, whose approval may be required, can pre-
vent the closing. I prefer to shape the transaction so that 
a closing can occur even if the outside party does not 
agree. I suppose you might say I hate openings and like 
closings. Preliminary shaping by an expert can test 
whether the ingredients for a closing are present. If they 
are not, breaking off saves the time and expense of con-
ducting negotiations that are doomed to failure. 
A deal with the right chemistry but wrong economics 
Can you illustrate a deal that has good chemistry but 
lacks sound economics? 
Sure. A case I had involving a customer-supplier rela-
tionship demonstrates the situation. A manufacturer—a 
public company—wanted to acquire a leading specialty 
regional retailer—a private company—by issuing its 
capital stock in exchange for the stock of the retailer. 
The managements had worked together for over 20 
years and had demonstrated mutual confidence. The 
manufacturer's stock was selling at 15 times earnings 
and it was willing to pay 12 times earnings for the re-
tailer. The marriage was projected to be beneficial 
because 
1. the manufacturer was not strong in the retailer's re-
gion so it had little business to lose, 
2. the retailer could shift almost exclusively to this 
manufacturer's materials without loss of sales and 
profits, 
3. thus the manufacturer would have incremental sales 
and profits from an under-utilized plant, and 
4. the retailer felt it could help acquire more captive 
retail business in other regions. 
On the face, it appeared that this transaction had both 
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chemistry and economics. 
The transaction did not close because the manufac-
turer felt the economic benefits were only short-run. 
Apparently, the manufacturer's marketing and sales peo-
ple reasoned that if they could get the equivalent addi-
tional sales from non-captive retailers, the profits of the 
manufacturer would rise faster because fewer shares 
would be outstanding (those saved by not acquiring the 
retailer in question). 
There probably was concern, too, that independent 
retailers, in other geographic regions where the manu-
facturer was already strong, might decide to shift busi-
ness to other manufacturers who were not likely to set 
up captive and competing retailers. 
Both parties wanted to continue their excellent rela-
tionship. As soon as it appeared the proposed acquisi-
tion would create economic problems, they broke off 
negotiations. The conflict arose not on the basic price, 
predicated on earnings, but on what appeared to be a 
technical matter—the size of certain book reserves. 
Usually, when the deal makes sense, the balance 
sheet does not take on such importance. In effect, this 
was an indirect way for the manufacturer to announce he 
wanted a lower multiple of earnings applied to the re-
tailer's business to take care of his uncertain evaluation, 
as buyer, of the long-term economic benefits of the 
transaction. The retailer could have lowered its price, 
but it did not. It evaluated its future as an independent 
optimistically, based on its past record and its current 
trend. 
So you see, although the chemistry was excellent and 
the transaction had favorable short-run benefits, the 
deal fell apart because the long-run benefits could not 
be projected with adequate certainty by both parties. 
Their long-run benefits seemed more secure to both 
parties if they stayed separate. I don't have any personal 
feelings about the conclusion. All I know is that each 
party in substance decided that the proposed transac-
tion lacked sound economics at the price the other party 
found satisfactory. 
Economics great, chemistry poor 
What about the reverse?—an illustration of a transac-
tion where the economics were great but the chemistry 
poor? 
I witnessed a good example in the purchase of a large 
service business. There buyer and seller had very little 
in common and aborted the negotiations several times. 
One thing kept them together—the price. The buyer 
placed a high potential value on the business. In effect 
the buyer paid about 20 times earnings in cash. 
So far the buyer has been right. Pre-tax operating 
profits doubled within five years of the deal. 
Was the seller wrong? 
Probably not. After the transaction was closed, it was 
learned that the seller had tried unsuccessfully for six 
months to sell the business at about 16 times earnings. 
Small wonder that the buyer was able to repair the nego-
tiations each time they broke apart. In the eyes of each 
party, the price looked good. 
The seller wanted to diversify his investment. The 
buyer wanted a growth business. Each got what he 
wanted on the merits of price. 
Why the buyer buys 
Essentially, what do you feel a buyer looks for? Oppor-
tunity? 
Right. From an investment standpoint a buyer gen-
erally looks for above-average return on investment, con-
sistent with safety. A buyer must consider realistically 
the alternative opportunities for investment. Courage is 
the essential characteristic of a buyer. The seller is pre-
sumed to know all about his industry and his company. 
If the seller is willing to dispose of the business, what 
makes a buyer think it is a good opportunity? Mostly the 
courage to believe that the situation will hold opportuni-
ties to make money. To be a buyer one must be an opti-
mist dedicated to seizing and using the opportunity. 
Why the seller sells 
What is the seller's goal? Insurance? 
Yes. The seller owns the business, so he already has 
opportunity; but in selling, he seeks to protect his down-
side risk. The seller is really buying insurance to termi-
nate or reduce his risk. 
What is the right price? 
With these conflicting interests—and as you said 
earlier that price is critical in putting a deal together— 
how do you arrive at the "right" price? It seems to us 
that it is especially difficult today. The sellers think it is 
still 1968 and value their companies at 20 times earnings 
while the buyers think 1970 will go on forever and value 
the same companies at 5 times earnings. 
Value is in the eyes of the beholder. There is no "right" 
price. My experience has shown price to be generally 
elastic. There is a series of "right" prices—a range in 
which the buyer can still see opportunity and the seller 
can gain insurance. One expert can determine a fair 
price that differs from the price of another expert for the 
same situation and facts. 
One technique I use to pinpoint value, and to avoid 
confusion, is to give the range of "right" prices in terms 
of all cash. This eliminates the intricate and often con-
fusing valuation problems that exist with notes, bonds, 
securities, warrants, and so forth. The all-cash price is 
like home base because it is from that price that modifi-
cations can be evaluated. 
Say, for example, you have a company manufacturing 
a proprietary product with sales of $2 million, pre-tax 
profits of $400,000 and after-tax profits of $200,000. As-
sume no long-term debt, a net worth of $1,500,000 and 
prospects for growth in earnings. What is the range of 
"right" prices, all cash, for the business? 
Remembering we are in a world where American Tele-
phone & Telegraph common is selling at 10 times earn-
ings and its bonds are yielding 9% to 10%, I would price 
the business in a range of 12 to 14 times earnings, or 
$2,400,000 to $2,800,000, all cash, depending on the 
evaluation of the growth trend. Of course, some buyers 
might refuse to go over $2,000,000 and the seller might 
not budge for a price below $3,000,000. Each might base 
his position on excellent reasons, but $2,400,000 to 
$2,800,000 expresses the range in which I estimate a 
buyer and seller could agree. 
That seems to be a fair range, but how did you come 
up with it? 
Well, that takes some knowledge and a lot of experi-
ence. It is an evaluation of alternative uses of $2,400,000 
in cash. At interest this money would bring $240,000 an-
nually before tax with safety of principal. At greater risk 
—in this illustration, it will bring $400,000 before-tax 
income. Notice also that the price range is less than 
twice the book net worth. All of this has been simplified 
as an all-cash transaction. 
Obviously, refinements of contingent payouts (with a 
lower cash price at closing) or the use of excess cash in 
the seller's business will affect the price. 
Does the company's size affect the price? 
Yes. Growth in a small company may be more sus-
tained than in a large company, but I value growth in a 
larger company at a higher multiple than the equivalent 
growth of a small company. A large company has de-
veloped greater resistance to failure (more depth of man-
agement and greater resources to find new manage-
ment, for example) and is, therefore, worth more. In a 
larger company, the multiple of earnings might be from 
14 to 16 instead of 12 to 14. Also the prices I quoted 
apply to 100% ownership and not to situations in which 
there are minority interests. 
Can every company be categorized as either a buyer 
or a seller? 
Such a classification really says: is a company actively 
seeking opportunities to employ its assets or is it at-
tempting to minimize its risk-taking? The answer is not 
given in terms of sale activity, but on how management 
views the business. Stockholders and creditors have an 
investment in the gross assets. Does management be-
lieve a profit can be produced? Will the profitability be 
competitive with that of other businesses? What steps 
can be taken to improve profitability? Does the business 
have the management to achieve greater profitability? 
These and other questions go to the heart of the invest-
ment situation and determine whether the business is 
essentially a buyer or a seller. In a large corporation, 
one division may be a seller, but on balance the corpo-
ration may be a buyer. In a small business, management 
may be looking for more equity capital, in which case 
the business would be considered a buyer because man-
agement expects to remain in control. If capital cannot 
be obtained on those terms, however, management may 
quickly become a seller. Generally, I would say that most 
companies are both buyers and sellers—and often 
simultaneously. 
Effect of the lack of liquidity 
We'd like to shift gears now, Herb, from the general 
area to certain current problems. What do you feel is the 
effect on mergers and acquisitions of the lack of corpo-
rate liquidity today? 
I think some businesses lack liquidity even in boom 
periods. The term "liquidity" puts the problem on too 
generalized a basis. It makes more sense to me to refer 
to each business as a special case—I like to talk about 
the short-term maturities of a particular business. In 
boom times there are bankruptcies mostly of smaller 
companies—that does not mean all small companies will 
go bankrupt. So now in a period of recession, if some 
large companies are getting into trouble—and, of 
course, there was the bankruptcy of the giant Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co., it does not follow that all large 
corporations face bankruptcy. Each company is a differ-
ent credit risk and each, accordingly, has a different 
resistance to adversity. That is more meaningful to me 
than the general status of lack of corporate liquidity. 
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The role of short-term maturities 
In your view, the credit risk of a company is based sub-
stantially on its short-term maturities? 
The credit risk depends on profitability—cash profit-
ability, cash flow. The nature of the industry, the posture 
of a particular company, the quality of management— 
all have a measure in determining credit risk. It is also 
important to know who the credit grantor is. Some credit 
people are far more savvy in particular industries than 
are others. The short-term maturities define the time 
interval available to management for using the assets 
without interference. 
What do you mean by short-term maturities? Bank 
loans and other creditor debt coming due within a year? 
Yes, and much more. To me it is every cash require-
ment that must be met within a two- to three-year period. 
Why such a long time? Because it takes time to arrange 
financing, to sell a division or other assets to get cash, to 
close down an unprofitable plant, to turn around a loss 
operation. The one-year rule is a general principle for 
financial reporting. The two- to three-year period I look 
at covers cycles of business in general as well as cycles 
of a particular company. When you look further ahead 
you tend to provide alternative and backup means of 
financing. 
Then a high rent cost or interest charge would be 
included in your definition of short-term maturities? 
Certainly. If the gross profits from operations drop, it 
may not be possible for the business to cover fixed 
charges such as rent and interest. Then the business has 
to program the working capital requirements to permit 
adequate time, either to improve gross profits or to cut 
overhead. 
Pitfalls of short-term maturities 
In your experience what types of mistakes are made 
in planning to meet short-term maturities? 
There are many examples that I have seen and they 
include these: 
a. Borrowing short to invest long—If you borrow to 
build an additional plant and would need five years 
to repay, don't start unless you have five-year fi-
nancing. Don't depend on a refinancing or public 
offering to solve the problem. The timing may not 
be convenient. Other examples of this are short-
term loans to buy a business, or revolving loans to 
cover fixed investments. The only safe course is to 
face up to the facts—make the financing match the 
company's ability to repay from operations or 
assets. 
b. Underestimating the time and expense required to 
make a new operation self-sustaining or to termi-
nate an old operation. With inflation, extra time has 
meant higher costs than contemplated. Often it is 
necessary to bring in equity capital or long-term 
money in larger proportions than appears needed 
in order to adjust for this problem. Financial fore-
sight is necessary, otherwise, some other people in 
the business management will enjoy the good things 
when they happen because present management 
will not survive. 
c. Delay in starting to use internal means for improv-
ing cash flow. Management may not give high prior-
ity to selling excess real estate, or to deferring taxes 
under special rules or to refinancing debt ahead of 
time. The management that delays these responsi-
bilities—which do notappearessential ingoodtimes 
but may not be feasible because too late in poor 
times—is giving itself less time and fewer options 
for solving unexpected problems. By taking these 
steps early, management may discover that the 
business cannot afford all the expansion that it 
planned. 
Herb, it sounds as if now is a bad time to negotiate 
acquisitions? 
No. What I am saying is that today one must think of 
survival before one thinks of growth. We are experienc-
ing difficulty in refinancing short-term maturities be-
cause of: 
1.a business recession coupled with higher cost of 
wages and interest, 
2. a stock market drop that makes public offerings 
very competitive, and sometimes impossible, and 
3. a tight bank and institutional money market that 
sees interesting alternative uses for money. With 
this background, management must weigh acquisi-
tions more carefully and must recognize that prices 
have been adjusted downward for the immediate 
future. 
I think we will see very good acquisition opportunities 
in the next few years, priced more realistically than 
we've seen for a long time. But management must plan 
and shape the deals carefully to assure survival in un-
charted waters. In fact, divestitures and mergers will be 
ways to solve the emergencies being created by current 
business conditions. 
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The effect of the new pooling rules on mergers 
The merger movement has already been effectively 
curtailed by a declining stock market, tight money, and 
antitrust worries. Do you think the new rules on pooling 
will further curtail it? 
Blame for any further curtailing of mergers should not 
be placed on the doorstep of the new pooling rules. 
There is no question that the new rules will reduce re-
ported earnings where applicable, but I have never found 
accountants to be a cause for creating or killing busi-
ness. 
An artist may express his view of the same object in 
different ways at different times. So, too, accountants 
may in the future express the financial impact of mergers 
in a more restricted way than they did in the past. 
It would be wonderful if everything were simple, but 
life isn't simple and financial reporting even less so. The 
new rules will be put into practice and financial analysts 
will explain how one company's earnings under the rules 
compare with another company's earnings not subject 
to the rules. As I said, the rules won't make things any 
simpler, but in my view, they will not prevent normal 
business activity. 
What is the major merger accounting change of the 
proposed pooling rules? 
In my opinion, reduction of post-merger earnings by 
the amortization of goodwill, heretofore not required. 
Speaking generally, if the combination qualifies as a 
pooling, the old rules continue with some limitations. 
The merger qualifies as a pooling if the combination in-
volves the exchange of common stock only for substan-
tially all the common stock interest of the acquired com-
pany. If the combination does not qualify as a pooling, 
it must be accounted as a purchase, which technique 
requires charging the goodwill in the acquisition against 
earnings over a period of not more than 40 years. In 
purchase accounting, the difference between the price 
paid for the acquired company and its book net assets 
should be assigned first to all net assets to bring them 
from a book basis to a current value basis; any unassign-
able difference is goodwill. In the past, however, this was 
not always done because the goodwill was not required 
to be charged to earnings as it now is. 
Will size alone make the difference of whether the 
post-merger earnings must be reduced by goodwill 
amortization? 
No. During the development of the proposed rules in 
pooling, relative size of the merger partners was very 
important. To avoid conflict over this issue, the size test 
was dropped. 
// the merger qualifies as a pooling, there need be no 
accounting for goodwill? 
That is correct. 
What type of industry could suffer from acquisition in 
purchase accounting? 
Service businesses where the net assets are not large. 
The value of the business may be four times net worth— 
growth of earnings being a factor to increase the multi-
ple of earnings. Marketing companies or consumer prod-
uct companies where net assets may not be large, and 
where advertising is a large factor may also fall into this 
new rule. In other words, where the goodwill is a large 
figure in relative terms. 
Well then don't you feel that prices for these compa-
nies will be depressed since if they are purchased the 
post-merger earnings could be reduced by goodwill 
amortization? 
Not really. First of all, they don't have to be part of 
any merger. If the earnings grow the stock market will 
reward the management for the earnings increases by a 
fair multiple. Second, a merger could be made with a 
company on an exchange of common stock only so the 
pooling rules would apply. It is my feeling people will 
always recognize a fine company. 
Have the new tax rules of 1969 hurt mergers and ac-
quisitions? 
Not to any great degree. A limitation has been im-
posed on a corporation's deduction of interest on certain 
bonds issued on the acquisition of another corporation's 
stock or assets. But this will not hurt many corporations 
for various technical reasons, one of which is an annual 
$5,000,000 interest exemption from the new rule. Effec-
tively then the limitation on the interest deduction is 
$5,000,000 when attributable to acquisition debt, subject 
to certain adjustments. 
Installment method reporting of gain on sale of a busi-
ness has been made somewhat restrictive in that it 
could be harder to meet the 30% test because payments 
in the year of sale now include certain evidences of in-
debtedness designed to make them tradable in an estab-
lished securities market. But it is still possible to use the 
installment method if care is exercised in designing the 
evidence of indebtedness. 
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Following is a summary of the conclusions reached by the APB in its Opinion #16, Business Combinations, and 
Opinion #17, Intangible Assets: 
Business combinations 
The purchase method and the pooling of interests 
method are both acceptable in accounting for business 
combinations although not as alternative accounting 
procedures for the same business combination. A busi-
ness combination which meets specified conditions re-
quires accounting by the pooling of interests method. 
All other business combinations should be accounted 
for as a purchase of one or more companies by a cor-
poration. The cost of an acquired company should be 
determined by the principles of accounting for the acqui-
sition of an asset. The cost of an acquired company 
should be allocated to the assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed based on the fair values of identifiable individ-
ual assets and liabilities, and the remainder of the cost 
should be recorded as goodwill. 
The following conditions must be met if pooling of 
interests accounting is to be used: 
• Each of the combining companies is autonomous 
and independent and has not been a subsidiary or di-
vision of another corporation within two years before 
the plan of combination is initiated. 
• The combination is effected in a single transac-
tion or is completed according to a specific plan within 
one year.1 
• A corporation issues only common stock with 
rights identical to those of the majority of its outstand-
ing voting common stock in exchange for substantially 
all of the voting common stock interest of another 
company. 
• Each of the combining companies maintains sub-
stantially the same voting common stock interest; with 
no exchanges, retirements, or distributions to stock-
holders in contemplation of effecting the combination. 
• Each of the combining companies reacquires 
shares of voting common stock only for purposes 
other than business combinations, and no company 
reacquires more than a normal number of shares after 
the date the plan of combination is initiated. 
• The ratio of the interest of an individual common 
stockholder to those of other common stockholders in 
a combining company remains the same as a result of 
the exchange of stock to effect the combination. 
• The voting rights to which the common stock 
ownership interests in the resulting combined corpo-
ration are entitled are exercisable by the stockholders; 
the stockholders are neither deprived of nor restricted 
in exercising those rights. 
• The combination is resolved at the date the plan 
is consummated and no provisions of the plan relating 
to the issue of securities or other consideration are 
pending. 
• The combined corporation does not agree di-
rectly or indirectly to retire or reacquire all or part of 
the common stock issued to effect the combination. 
• The combined corporation does not enter into 
other financial arrangements for the benefit of the 
former stockholders of a combining company, such as 
a guaranty of loans secured by stock issued in the 
combination, which in effect negates the exchange of 
equity securities. 
• The combined corporation does not intend or 
plan to dispose of a significant part of the assets of 
the combining companies within two years after the 
combination except to eliminate duplicate facilities or 
excess capacity and those assets that would have 
been disposed of in the ordinary course of business 
of the separate company. 
Under poolings it has been possible to include the 
profits of an acquired company in net income reported 
to stockholders even though the pooling took place after 
the end of the year reported on. This will now be pro-
hibited. 
Intangible assets 
A corporation should record as assets the costs of 
intangible assets acquired from others, including good-
will acquired in a business combination. A corporation 
may record as assets the costs to develop identifiable 
intangible assets but should record as expenses the 
costs to develop intangible assets which are not specifi-
cally identifiable, such as goodwill. 
The cost of each type of intangible asset should be 
amortized from date of acquisition by systematic 
charges to income over the period estimated to be bene-
fited. The period of amortization should not exceed forty 
years. 
Effective date 
The provisions of the Opinions are effective for busi-
ness combinations initiated after October 31, 1970 and 
apply to intangible assets recognized in those combina-
tions or otherwise acquired after October 31,1970. 
As defined in Opinion #16, date of initiation is the ear-
lier of (1) the date the major terms of a plan, including 
the ratio of exchange of stock, are announced publicly 
or otherwise formally made known to the stockholders 
of any of the combining companies or (2) the date that 
stockholders of a combining company are notified in 
writing of an exchange offer. 
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